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Abstract. In this paper, we study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum
games played on finite graphs with both reachability and safety objectives. In this
framework a player with a reachability objective aims at reaching his own goal as soon
as possible, whereas a player with a safety objective aims at avoiding his bad set or,
if impossible, delaying its visit as long as possible. We prove the existence of Nash
equilibria with finite memory in quantitative multiplayer reachability/safety games.
Moreover, we prove the existence of finite-memory secure equilibria for quantitative
two-player reachability games.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium, Turn-based quantitative game, Secure equilibrium, Reachabil-
ity/Safety objectives.
1 Introduction
General framework. The construction of correct and efficient computer systems (hardware or
software) is recognized as an extremely difficult task. To support the design and verification of
such systems, mathematical logic, automata theory [10] and more recently model-checking [7]
have been intensively studied. The model-checking approach, which is now an important part
of the design cycle in industries, has proved its efficiency when applied to systems that can
be accurately modeled as a finite-state automaton. In contrast, the application of these tech-
niques to computer software, complex systems like embedded systems or distributed systems
has been less successful. This could be partly explained by the following reasons: classical
automata-based models do not faithfully capture the complex interactive behavior of modern
computational systems that are usually composed of several interacting components, also in-
teracting with an environment that is only partially under control. Recent research works show
that it is suitable to generalize automata models used in the classical approach to verification,
with the more flexible and mathematically deeper game-theoretic framework [14,15].
Game theory meets automata theory. The basic framework that extends computational mod-
els with concepts from game theory is the so-called two-player zero-sum games played on
graphs [8]. Many problems in verification and design of reactive systems can be modeled with
this approach, like modeling controller-environment interactions. Given a model of a system
interacting with a hostile environment, given a control objective (like preventing the system
to reach some bad configurations), the controller synthesis problem asks to build a controller
ensuring that the control objective is enforced whatever the environment will do. Two-player
zero-sum games played on graphs are adequate models to solve this problem [16]. Moves of
Player 1 model actions of the controller whereas moves of Player 2 m
actions of the environment, and a winning strategy for Player 1 is an abstract form of a control
program that enforces the control objective.
The controller synthesis problem is suitable to model purely antagonist interactions be-
tween a controller and a hostile environment. However in order to study more complex sys-
tems with more than two components whose objectives are not necessarily antagonist, we
need multiplayer and non zero-sum games to model them adequately. Moreover, we do not
look for winning strategies, but rather try to find relevant notions of equilibria, for instance
the famous notion of Nash equilibria [14]. On the other hand, only qualitative objectives have
been considered so far to specify, for example, that a player must be able to reach a target set
of states in the underlying game graph. But, in line with the previous point, we also want to
express and solve games for quantitative objectives such as forcing the game to reach a par-
ticular set of states within a given time bound, or within a given energy consumption limit. In
summary, we need to study equilibria for multiplayer non zero-sum games played on graphs
with quantitative objectives. This article provides some new results in this research direction.
Related work. Several recent papers have considered two-player zero-sum games played on
finite graphs with regular objectives enriched by some quantitative aspects. Let us mention
some of them: games with finitary objectives [6], games with prioritized requirements [1],
request-response games where the waiting times between the requests and the responses are
minimized [11,17], and games whose winning conditions are expressed via quantitative lan-
guages [2].
Other works concern qualitative non zero-sum games. The notion of secure equilibrium,
an interesting refinement of Nash equilibrium, has been introduced in [5]. It has been proved
that a unique secure equilibrium always exists for two-player non zero-sum games with reg-
ular objectives. In [9], general criteria ensuring existence of Nash equilibria, subgame perfect
equilibria (resp. secure equilibria) are provided for n-player (resp. 2-player) games, as well as
complexity results.
Finally, we mention reference [3] that combines both quantitative and non zero-sum as-
pects. It is maybe the nearest related work compared to us, however the framework and the
objectives are pretty different. In [3], the authors study games played on graphs with terminal
vertices where quantitative payoffs are assigned to the players. These games may have cycles
but all the infinite plays form a single outcome (like in chess where every infinite play is a
draw). That paper gives criteria that ensure the existence of Nash (and subgame perfect)
equilibria in pure and memoryless strategies.
Our contribution. We here study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games
played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In this framework each player aims at
reaching his own goal as soon as possible. We focus on existence results for two solution
concepts: Nash equilibrium and secure equilibrium. We prove the existence of finite-memory
Nash (resp. secure) equilibria in n-player (resp. 2-player) games. Moreover, we prove that
given a Nash (resp. secure) equilibrium of a n-player (resp. 2-player) game, we can build
a finite-memory Nash (resp. secure) equilibrium of the same type, i.e. preserving the set of
players achieving their objectives. For the case of Nash equilibria, we extend our results in
two directions. First we prove that finite-memory Nash equilibria still exist when the model is
enriched by allowing n-tuples of non-negative costs on edges (one cost by player). This result
provides an answer to a question we posed in [4]. Secondly, we prove the existence of Nash
equilibria in quantitative games where both safety and reachability objectives coexist.
Our results are not a direct consequence of the existing results in the qualitative framework,
they require some new proof techniques. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first general
result about the existence of equilibria in quantitative multiplayer games played on graphs.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 is dedicated to definitions. We present the games and
the equilibria we study. In Section 3 we first prove an existence result for Nash equilibria
and provide the finite-memory characterization. Similar results concerning secure equilibria in
two-player games are established in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss the extensions
of our results on Nash equilibria.
A part of these results has been published in [4], namely the existence of finite-memory Nash
(resp. secure) equilibria in multiplayer (resp. 2-player) games, and the fact that given a Nash
equilibrium we can build a finite-memory Nash equilibrium of the same type. Additionally in
this paper we give proofs of the previous results and we extend our existence result for Nash
equilibria in the two directions mentioned above, namely (i) n-tuples of non-negative costs on
edges and (ii) reachability/safety objectives. Moreover, in the two-player case, we prove that
given a secure equilibrium, we can build a finite-memory secure equilibrium of the same type.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Definitions
We consider here quantitative games played on a graph where all the players have reachability1
objectives. It means that, given a certain set of vertices Goali, each player i wants to reach one
of these vertices as soon as possible.
This section is mainly inspired by reference [9].
Definition 1. An infinite turn-based quantitative multiplayer reachability game is a tuple
G = (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , v0, E, (Goali)i∈Π) where
• Π is a finite set of players,
• G = (V, (Vi)i∈Π , v0, E) is a finite directed graph where V is the set of vertices, (Vi)i∈Π
is a partition of V into the state sets of each player, v0 ∈ V is the initial vertex, and
E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges, and
• Goali ⊆ V is the goal set of player i.
We assume that each vertex has at least one outgoing edge. The game is played as follows.
A token is first placed on the vertex v0. Player i, such that v0 ∈ Vi, has to choose one of the
outgoing edges of v0 and put the token on the vertex v1 reached when following this edge.
Then, it is the turn of the player who owns v1. And so on.
A play ρ ∈ V ω (resp. a history h ∈ V +) of G is an infinite (resp. a finite) path through the
graph G starting from vertex v0. Note that a history is always non empty because it starts
with v0. The set H ⊆ V
+ is made up of all the histories of G. A prefix (resp. proper prefix ) p
of a history h = h0 . . . hk is a finite sequence h0 . . . hl, with l ≤ k (resp. l < k), denoted by
p ≤ h (resp. p < h). We similarly consider a prefix p of a play ρ, denoted by p < ρ.
We say that a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . visits a set S ⊆ V (resp. a vertex v ∈ V ) if there exists
l ∈ N such that ρl is in S (resp. ρl = v). The same terminology also stands for a history h.
Similarly, we say that ρ visits S after (resp. in) a prefix ρ0 . . . ρk if there exists l > k (resp.
l ≤ k) such that ρl is in S. For any play ρ we denote by Visit(ρ) the set of players i ∈ Π
1 The general case of reachability/safety objectives is handled in Subsection 5.1.
such that ρ visits Goali. The set Visit(h) for a history h is defined similarly. The function Last
returns, given a history h = h0 . . . hk, the last vertex hk of h, and the length |h| of h is the
number k of its edges2.
For any play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . of G, we note Costi(ρ) the cost of player i, defined by:
Costi(ρ) =
{
l if l is the least index such that ρl ∈ Goali,
+∞ otherwise.
We note Cost(ρ) = (Costi(ρ))i∈Π the cost profile for the play ρ. The aim of each player i is to
minimize the cost he has to pay, i.e. reach his goal set Goali as soon as possible.
A strategy of player i in G is a function σ : V ∗Vi → V assigning to each history hv ending
in a vertex v of player i, a next vertex σ(hv) such that (v, σ(hv)) belongs to E. We say that a
play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . of G is consistent with a strategy σ of player i if ρk+1 = σ(ρ0 . . . ρk) for all
k ∈ N such that ρk ∈ Vi. The same terminology is used for a history h of G. A strategy profile
of G is a tuple (σi)i∈Π where σi is a strategy for player i. It determines a unique play of G
consistent with each strategy σi, called the outcome of (σi)i∈Π and denoted by 〈(σi)i∈Π〉.
A strategy σ of player i is memoryless if σ depends only on the current vertex, i.e. σ(hv) =
σ(v) for all h ∈ H and v ∈ Vi. More generally, σ is a finite-memory strategy if the equivalence
relation ≈σ on H defined by h ≈σ h′ if σ(hδ) = σ(h′δ) for all δ ∈ V ∗Vi has finite index.
In other words, a finite-memory strategy is a strategy that can be implemented by a finite
automaton with output. A strategy profile (σi)i∈Π is called memoryless or finite-memory if
each σi is a memoryless or a finite-memory strategy, respectively.
For a strategy profile (σi)i∈Π with outcome ρ and a strategy σ
′
j of player j (j ∈ Π), we
say that player j deviates from ρ after a prefix h of ρ if there exists a prefix h′ of ρ such that
h ≤ h′, h′ is consistent with σ′j and σ
′
j(h
′) 6= σj(h′). We also say that player j deviates from ρ
just after a prefix h of ρ if h is consistent with σ′j and σ
′
j(h) 6= σj(h).
We now introduce the notion of Nash equilibrium and secure equilibrium.
Definition 2. A strategy profile (σi)i∈Π of a game G is a Nash equilibrium if for all player j ∈
Π and for all strategy σ′j of player j, we have:
Costj(ρ) ≤ Costj(ρ
′)
where ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉 and ρ′ = 〈σ′j , (σi)i∈Π\{j}〉.
This definition means that player j (for all j ∈ Π) has no incentive to deviate since he
increases his cost when using σ′j instead of σj . Keeping notations of Definition 2 in mind, a
strategy σ′j such that Costj(ρ) > Costj(ρ
′) is called a profitable deviation for player j with
respect to (σi)i∈Π . In this case either player j pays an infinite cost for ρ and a finite cost for
ρ′ (ρ′ visits Goalj , but ρ does not), or player j pays a finite cost for ρ and a strictly lower cost
for ρ′ (ρ′ visits Goalj earlier than ρ does).
As our results on secure equilibria stand for two-player games, we define this notion only
in this context. In order to define the concept of secure equilibrium3 we first need to associate
two appropriate binary relations ≺1 and ≺2 on cost profiles with player 1 and 2 respectively.
Given two cost profiles (x1, x2) and (y1, y2):
(x1, x2) ≺1 (y1, y2) iff (x1 > y1) ∨ (x1 = y1 ∧ x2 < y2) .
2 Note that the length is not defined as the number of vertices.
3 Our definition naturally extends the notion of secure equilibrium proposed in [5] to the quantitative
reachability framework. A longer discussion comparing the two notions can be found in Section 2.2.
We then say that player 1 prefers (y1, y2) to (x1, x2). In other words, player 1 prefers a cost
profile to another either if he can decrease his own cost, or if he can increase the cost of
player 2, while keeping his own cost. We define the relation ≺2 symmetrically.
Definition 3. A strategy profile (σ1, σ2) of a two-player game G is a secure equilibrium if
there does not exist any strategy σ′1 of player 1 such that:
Cost(ρ) ≺1 Cost(ρ
′)
where ρ = 〈σ1, σ2〉 and ρ
′ = 〈σ′1, σ2〉, and there does not exist any strategy σ
′
2 of player 2 such
that:
Cost(ρ) ≺2 Cost(ρ
′)
where ρ = 〈σ1, σ2〉 and ρ′ = 〈σ1, σ′2〉.
In other words, player 1 (resp. 2) has no incentive to deviate, with respect to the relation ≺1
(resp. ≺2). Note that any secure equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. A strategy σ′j such that
Cost(ρ) ≺j Cost(ρ′) is called a ≺j-profitable deviation for player j with respect to (σ1, σ2) (for
j ∈ {1, 2}).
Let us go back to the multiplayer framework and define the notion of type of an equilibrium.
Definition 4. The type of a strategy profile (σi)i∈Π in a reachability game G is the set of
players j ∈ Π such that the outcome ρ of (σi)i∈Π visits Goalj. It is denoted by Type((σi)i∈Π).
In other words, Type((σi)i∈Π) = Visit(ρ).
The previous definitions are illustrated in the following example.
Example 5. Let G = (V, V1, V2, v0, E,Goal1,Goal2) be the two-player game depicted in Fig-
ure 1. The states of player 1 (resp. 2) are represented by circles (resp. squares)4. Thus, ac-
cording to Figure 1, V1 = {A,C,D} and V2 = {B}, the initial vertex v0 is the vertex A, and
we set Goal1 = {C} and Goal2 = {D}.
AB D
C
Fig. 1. A two-player game with Goal1 = {C} and Goal2 = {D}.
An example of play in G is given by ρ = (AD)ω , which visits Goal2 but not Goal1, leading
to the cost profile Cost((AD)ω) = (+∞, 1). The play ρ is, among others, the outcome of the
strategy5 profile (σ1, σ2) where σ1(hA) = D and σ2(hB) = C, for all histories h.
4 We will keep this convention through the article.
5 Note that player 1 has no choice in vertices C and D, that is, σ1(hv) is necessarily equal to A
for v ∈ {C,D}.
Let us show that the strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is not a Nash equilibrium, by proving that
player 1 has a profitable deviation σ′1 in which he manages to decrease his own cost. With
σ′1 defined by σ
′
1(hA) = B, we get the play 〈σ
′
1, σ2〉 = (ABC)
ω such that Cost((ABC)ω) =
(2,+∞), and in particular Cost1((ABC)ω) < Cost1(ρ).
On the opposite side, one can show that (σ′1, σ2) is a Nash equilibrium. However (σ
′
1, σ2)
is not a secure equilibrium. Indeed, player 2 has a ≺2-profitable deviation in which he can
increase player 1’s cost without modifying his own cost. With σ′2 the strategy of player 2 defined
by σ′2(hB) = A, we get the play 〈σ
′
1, σ
′
2〉 = (AB)
ω such that Cost((AB)ω) = (+∞,+∞), and
Cost(〈σ′1, σ2〉) ≺2 Cost(〈σ
′
1, σ
′
2〉).
Notice that all strategies discussed so far are memoryless. In order to obtain a Nash equi-
librium of type {1, 2}, finite-memory strategies are necessary. We define the following finite-
memory strategy profile (τ1, τ2):
τ1(hA) =
{
D if h = ǫ
B if h 6= ǫ
; τ2(hB) =
{
C if h visits D
A otherwise.
The outcome π = 〈(τ1, τ2)〉 is equal to AD(ABC)ω and has costs (4, 1). In order to prove that
(τ1, τ2) is a Nash equilibrium, we prove that no player has a profitable deviation. For player 2
it is clearly impossible to get a cost less than 1. To try to get a cost less than 4, player 1
must use a strategy τ ′1 such that τ
′
1(A) = B. But then player 2 chooses τ2(AB) = A. The
prefix ABA of the outcome of (τ ′1, τ2) shows that player 1 will increase his cost of 4.
However (τ1, τ2) is not a secure equilibrium since player 2 has a ≺2-profitable deviation τ ′2
such that τ ′2(hB) = A for all histories h. One can show that, in this example, there is no secure
equilibrium of type {1, 2}.
The questions studied in this article are the following ones:
Problem 1 Given G a quantitative multiplayer (resp. two-player) reachability game, does
there exist a Nash equilibrium (resp. a secure equilibrium) in G?
Problem 2 Given a Nash equilibrium (resp. a secure equilibrium) in a quantitative multi-
player (resp. two-player) reachability game G, does there exist a finite-memory Nash equilib-
rium (resp. secure equilibrium) with the same type?
We provide positive answers in Sections 3 and 4. Notice that these problems have been inves-
tigated in the qualitative framework (see [9]).
2.2 Qualitative Games vs Quantitative Games
We show in this section that Problems 1 and 2 can not be reduced to problems on qualitative
games.
Given a quantitative multiplayer reachability game G, one can naturally define a qualitative
version of G, denoted by G, such that the payoffs6 are qualitative. Given a play ρ of G, the
qualitative payoff of player i is defined by:
Payoffi(ρ) =
{
Win if Costi(ρ) is finite
Lose otherwise.
6 For qualitative games, we use the notion of payoff rather than the notion of cost since Win (resp.
Lose) can be seen as a payoff of 1 (resp. 0) and the aim of the players is to maximize their payoffs.
We note Payoff(ρ) = (Payoffi(ρ))i∈Π the qualitative payoff profile for the play ρ. In this
framework, player i aims at reaching his own goal set, i.e. at obtaining payoff Win. With this
idea in mind, one can naturally adapt the notion of Nash (resp. secure) equilibrium to the
qualitative framework.
The existence of Nash (resp. secure) equilibria in n-player (resp. 2-player) qualitative
games G has been proved in [9, Corollary 12] (resp. [5, Theorem 2]) for reachability objectives,
and more generally for Borel objectives.
The next example illustrates that lifting Nash equilibria in G to Nash equilibria in G does
not work. We developed new ideas in Sections 3 and 4 to solve Problem 1.
Example 6. Let us now consider the two-player game G depicted in Figure 2, such that Goal1 =
{B,E} and Goal2 = {C}. Notice that only player 1 effectively plays in this game. We are going
to exhibit a secure (and thus Nash) equilibrium (σ1, σ2) in the qualitative game G that can
not be lifted neither to a secure nor to a Nash equilibrium in the quantitative game G. The
strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is defined such that 〈(σ1, σ2)〉 = ADEω. It is a secure equilibrium
in G with the qualitative payoff profile (Win, Lose). However (σ1, σ2) is not a Nash (and thus
not a secure) equilibrium in G. Indeed, the play ABCω provides a smaller cost to player 1,
i.e. Cost1(ABC
ω) < Cost1(ADE
ω). Notice that in this example, there is no equilibrium in G
of type {1}.
A
B
D
C
E
Fig. 2. A game G with an equilibrium in G that can not be lifted to G.
The next proposition shows that on the opposite side, any Nash equilibrium in a quanti-
tative game G can be lifted to a Nash equilibrium in the qualitative game G.
Proposition 7. If (σi)i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium in a quantitative multiplayer reachability
game G, then (σi)i∈Π is also a Nash equilibrium in G.
Proof. For a contradiction, let us assume that in G, player j has a profitable deviation σ′j
w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π . This is only possible if Payoffj(〈(σi)i∈Π〉) = Lose and Payoffj(〈σ
′
j , (σi)i∈Π\{j}〉) =
Win. Thus when playing σ′j against (σi)i∈Π\{j} , player j manages to visit Goalj . Clearly
enough, σ′j would also be a profitable deviation w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π in G, contradicting the hypoth-
esis. ⊓⊔
Note that Proposition 7 is false for secure equilibria. To see that, let us come back to
the game G of Figure 2. The strategy profile (σ1, σ2) such that 〈σ1, σ2〉 = ABCω is a secure
equilibrium in the quantitative game G but not in the qualitative game G.
2.3 Unraveling
In the proofs of this article we need to unravel the graph G = (V, (Vi)i∈Π , v0, E) from the
initial vertex v0, which ends up in an infinite tree, denoted by T . This tree can be seen as a
new graph where the set of vertices is the set H of histories of G, the initial vertex is v0, and
a pair (hv, hvv′) ∈ H × H is an edge of T if (v, v′) ∈ E. A history h is a vertex of player i
in T if Last(h) ∈ Vi, and it belongs to the goal set of player i if Last(h) ∈ Goali.
We denote by T the related game. This game T played on the unraveling T of G is equiv-
alent to the game G that is played on G in the following sense. A play (ρ0)(ρ0ρ1)(ρ0ρ1ρ2) . . .
in T induces a unique play ρ = ρ0ρ1ρ2 . . . in G, and conversely. Thus, we denote a play in T
by the respective play in G. The bijection between plays of G and plays of T allows us to use
the same cost function Cost, and to transform easily strategies in G to strategies in T (and
conversely).
We also need to study the tree T limited to a certain depth d ≥ 0: we note Truncd(T )
the truncated tree of T of depth d and Truncd(T ) the finite game played on Truncd(T ). More
precisely, the set of vertices of Truncd(T ) is the set of histories h ∈ H of length ≤ d; the edges
of Truncd(T ) are defined in the same way as for T except that for the histories h of length d,
there exists no edge (h, hv). A play ρ in Truncd(T ) corresponds to a history of G of length
equal to d. The notions of cost and strategy are defined exactly like in the game T , but limited
to the depth d. For instance, a player pays an infinite cost for a play ρ (of length d) if his goal
set is not visited by ρ.
2.4 Qualitative Two-player Zero-sum Reachability Games
In this section we recall well-known properties of qualitative two-player zero-sum reachability
games [8, Chapter 2]. This will be necessary in our proofs.
Definition 8. A qualitative two-player zero-sum reachability game is a tuple G = (V, V1, V2, E,Goal)
where
• G = (V, V1, V2, E) is a finite directed graph where V is the set of vertices, V1, V2 is a
partition of V into the state sets of player 1 and player 2, and E ⊆ V × V is the set of
edges,
• Goal ⊆ V is the goal set of player 1.
Given an initial vertex v0 ∈ V , the notions of play, history and strategy are the same as
the ones defined in Section 2.1. Player 1 (resp. player 2) wins a play ρ of G if ρ visits Goal
(resp. ρ does not visit Goal). The game is said zero-sum because every play is won by exactly
one of the two players.
In zero-sum games, it is interesting to know if one of the players can play in such a way
that he is sure to win, however the other player plays. We can formalize this by introducing
the notion of winning strategy. A strategy σi for player i is a winning strategy from an initial
vertex v if all plays of G starting in v that are consistent with σi are won by player i. If player i
has a winning strategy in G from v, we say that player i wins the game G from v. We say that
a game G is determined if for all v ∈ V , one of the two players has a winning strategy from v.
Martin showed [13] that every qualitative two-player zero-sum game with a Borel type
winning condition is determined. In particular, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 9 ([8]). Let G = (V, V1, V2, E,Goal) be a qualitative two-player zero-sum reach-
ability game. Then for all v ∈ V , one of the two players has a memoryless winning strategy
from v (in particular, G is determined).
Moreover for all vertices v from which he wins the game, player 1 (resp. player 2) has a
memoryless strategy that is independent of v and that forces the play to visit Goal within at
most |V | − 1 edges (resp. to stay in V \ Goal).
3 Nash Equilibria
From now on we will often use the term game to denote a quantitative multiplayer reachability
game according to Definition 1.
3.1 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium
In this section we positively solve Problem 1 for Nash equilibria.
Theorem 10. In every quantitative multiplayer reachability game, there exists a finite-memory
Nash equilibrium.
The proof of this theorem is based on the following ideas. By Kuhn’s theorem (Theorem 11),
there exists a Nash equilibrium in the game Truncd(T ) played on the finite tree Truncd(T ), for
any depth d. By choosing an adequate depth d, Proposition 13 enables to extend this Nash
equilibrium to a Nash equilibrium in the infinite tree T , and thus in G. Let us detail these
ideas.
We first recall Kuhn’s theorem [12]. A preference relation is a total reflexive transitive
binary relation.
Theorem 11 (Kuhn’s theorem). Let Γ be a finite tree and GΓ a game played on Γ . For
each player i ∈ Π, let -i be a preference relation on cost profiles. Then there exists a strategy
profile (σi)i∈Π such that for every player j ∈ Π and every strategy σ′j of player j in GΓ we
have
Cost(ρ′) -j Cost(ρ)
where ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉 and ρ′ = 〈σ′j , (σi)i∈Π\{j}〉.
Note that Cost(ρ′) -j Cost(ρ) means that player j prefers the cost profile of the play ρ
than the one of ρ′, or they are equivalent for him.
Corollary 12. Let G be a game and T be the unraveling of G. Let Truncd(T ) be the game
played on the truncated tree of T of depth d, with d ≥ 0. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium
in Truncd(T ).
Proof. For each player j ∈ Π , we define the relation -j on cost profiles in the following way:
let (xi)i∈Π and (yi)i∈Π be two cost profiles, we say that (xi)i∈Π -j (yi)i∈Π iff xj ≥ yj . It is
clearly a preference relation which captures the Nash equilibrium. The strategy profile (σi)i∈Π
of Kuhn’s theorem is then a Nash equilibrium in Truncd(T ). ⊓⊔
Proposition 13 states that it is possible to extend a Nash equilibrium in Truncd(T ) to
a Nash equilibrium in the game T , if the depth d is equal to (|Π | + 1) · 2 · |V |. We obtain
Theorem 10 as a consequence of Corollary 12 and Proposition 13.
Proposition 13. Let G be a game and T be the unraveling of G. Let Truncd(T ) be the game
played on the truncated tree of T of depth d = (|Π |+1)·2·|V |. If there exists a Nash equilibrium
in the game Truncd(T ), then there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium in the game T .
The proof of Proposition 13 roughly works as follows. Let (σi)i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium
in Truncd(T ). A well-chosen prefix αβ, with β being a cycle, is first extracted from the out-
come ρ of (σi)i∈Π . The outcome of the required Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π in T will be equal
to αβω . As soon as a player deviates from this play, all the other players form a coalition to
punish him in a way that this deviation is not profitable for him. These ideas are detailed in
Lemmas 15 and 16. One can see Lemma 15 as a technical result used to prove Lemma 16,
which is the main ingredient to show Proposition 13. The proof of Lemma 15 relies on a
particular case (stated below) of Proposition 9. More precisely, we consider the qualitative
two-player zero-sum game Gj played on the graph G, where player j plays in order to reach
his goal set Goalj , against the coalition of all other players that wants to prevent him from
reaching his goal set. Player j plays on the vertices from Vj and the coalition on V \ Vj .
Proposition 14 ([8]). Let Gj = (V, Vj , V \ Vj , E,Goalj) be the qualitative two-player zero-
sum reachability game associated to player j. Then player j has a memoryless strategy νj that
enables him to reach Goalj within |V | − 1 edges from each vertex v from which he wins the
game Gj . On the contrary, the coalition has a memoryless strategy ν−j that forces the play to
stay in V \ Goalj from each vertex v from which it wins the game Gj .
Lemma 15. Suppose d ≥ 0. Let (σi)i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in Truncd(T ) and ρ the (finite)
outcome of (σi)i∈Π . Assume that ρ has a prefix αβγ, where β contains at least one vertex,
such that
Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ)
Last(α) = Last(αβ)
|αβ| ≤ l · |V |
|αβγ| = (l + 1) · |V |
for some l ≥ 1.
Let j ∈ Π be such that α does not visit Goalj. Consider the qualitative two-player zero-sum
game Gj = (V, Vj , V \ Vj , E,Goalj). Then for all histories hu of G consistent with (σi)i∈Π\{j}
and such that |hu| ≤ |αβ|, the coalition of the players i 6= j wins the game Gj from u.
Condition Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ) means that if Goali is visited by αβγ, it has already been
visited by α. Condition Last(α) = Last(αβ) means that β is a cycle. The play ρ of Lemma 15
is illustrated in Figure 3.
Lemma 15 says in particular that the players i 6= j can play together to prevent player j
from reaching his goal set Goalj , in case he deviates from the play αβ (as αβ is consistent
with (σi)i∈Π\{j}). We denote by ν−j the memoryless winning strategy of the coalition. For
each player i 6= j, let νi,j be the memoryless strategy of player i in G induced by ν−j .
Proof (of Lemma 15). By contradiction suppose that player j wins the game Gj from u. By
Proposition 14 player j has a memoryless winning strategy νj which enables him to reach
his goal set Goalj within at most |V | − 1 edges from u. We show that νj leads to a profitable
deviation for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π in the game Truncd(T ), which is impossible by hypothesis.
Let ρ′ be a play in Truncd(T ) such that hu is a prefix of ρ′, and from u, player j plays
according to the strategy νj and the other players i 6= j continue to play according to σi. As
the play ρ′ is consistent with the memoryless winning strategy νj from u, it visits Goalj and
we have
Costj(ρ
′) ≤ |hu|+ |V | (by Proposition 14)
≤ (l + 1) · |V | (by hypothesis)
≤ d (as αβγ ≤ ρ).
We consider the following two cases. If Costj(ρ) = +∞ (i.e. ρ does not visit Goalj), we
have
Costj(ρ
′) < Costj(ρ) = +∞.
On the contrary, if Costj(ρ) < +∞ (i.e. ρ visits Goalj , but after the prefix αβγ by hypothesis),
then we have
Costj(ρ
′) < Costj(ρ)
as Costj(ρ) > (l + 1) · |V |.
Since ρ′ is consistent with (σi)i∈Π\{j}, the strategy of player j induced by the play ρ
′ is a
profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π in both cases, which is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Now that we have proved Lemma 15, we use it in order to obtain Lemma 16, which
states that one can define a Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π in the game T , based on the Nash
equilibrium (σi)i∈Π in the game Truncd(T ).
Lemma 16. Suppose d ≥ 0. Let (σi)i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in Truncd(T ) and αβγ be a
prefix of ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉 as defined in Lemma 15. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π
in the game T . Moreover (τi)i∈Π is finite-memory, and Type((τi)i∈Π) = Visit(α).
Proof. Let us set Π = {1, . . . , n}. As α and β end in the same vertex, we can consider the
infinite play αβω in the game T . Without loss of generality we can order the players i ∈ Π so
that
∀i ≤ k Costi(αβ
ω) < +∞ (α visits Goali)
∀i > k Costi(αβ
ω) = +∞ (α does not visit Goali)
where 0 ≤ k ≤ n. In the second case, notice that ρ could visit Goali (but after the prefix αβγ).
The Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π required by Lemma 16 is intuitively defined as follows. First
the outcome of (τi)i∈Π is exactly αβ
ω . Secondly the first player j who deviates from αβω is
punished by the coalition of the other players in the following way. If j ≤ k and the deviation
occurs in the tree Truncd(T ), then the coalition plays according to (σi)i∈Π\{j} in this tree.
It prevents player j from reaching his goal set Goalj faster than in αβ
ω. And if j > k, the
coalition plays according to (νi,j)i∈Π\{j} (given by Lemma 15) so that player j does not reach
his goal set at all.
We begin by defining a punishment function P on the vertex set H of T such that P (h)
indicates the first player j who has deviated from αβω , with respect to h. We write P (h) = ⊥ if
no deviation has occurred. For v0, we define P (v0) = ⊥ and for h ∈ V + such that Last(h) ∈ Vi
and v ∈ V , we let:
P (hv) =


⊥ if P (h) = ⊥ and hv < αβω ,
i if P (h) = ⊥ and hv 6< αβω ,
P (h) otherwise (P (h) 6= ⊥) .
The Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π is then defined as follows: let h be a history ending in a
vertex of Vi,
τi(h) =


v if P (h) = ⊥ (h < αβω); such that hv < αβω ,
arbitrary if P (h) = i,
νi,P (h)(h) if P (h) 6= ⊥, i and P (h) > k,
σi(h) if P (h) 6= ⊥, i, P (h) ≤ k and |h| < d,
arbitrary otherwise (P (h) 6= ⊥, i, P (h) ≤ k and |h| ≥ d)
(1)
where arbitrary means that the next vertex is chosen arbitrarily (in a memoryless way). Clearly
the outcome of (τi)i∈Π is the play αβ
ω, and Type((τi)i∈Π) is equal to Visit(α) (= Visit(αβ)).
It remains to prove that (τi)i∈Π is a finite-memory Nash equilibrium in the game T . We
first show that the strategy profile (τi)i∈Π defined in Equation (1) is a Nash equilibrium in
the game T . Let τ ′j be a strategy of player j. We show that this is not a profitable deviation
for player j w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π . We distinguish the following two cases:
(i) j ≤ k (Costj(αβω) < +∞, α visits Goalj).
To improve his cost, player j has no incentive to deviate after the prefix α. Thus we assume
that the strategy τ ′j causes a deviation from a vertex visited in α. By Equation (1) the
other players first play according to (σi)i∈Π\{j} in Truncd(T ), and then in an arbitrary
way.
Suppose that τ ′j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π in the game T . Let us
set π = 〈(τi)i∈Π〉 and π′ = 〈τ ′j , (τi)i∈Π\{j}〉. Then
Costj(π
′) < Costj(π).
On the other hand we know that
Costj(π) = Costj(ρ) ≤ |α|.
So if we limit the play π′ in T to its prefix of length d, we get a play ρ′ in Truncd(T ) such
that
Costj(ρ
′) = Costj(π
′) < Costj(ρ).
As the play ρ′ is consistent with the strategies (σi)i∈Π\{j} by Equation (1), the strategy τ
′
j
restricted to the tree Truncd(T ) is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π in the
game Truncd(T ). This contradicts the fact that (σi)i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium in this game.
(ii) j > k (Costj(αβ
ω) = +∞, αβω does not visit Goalj).
If player j deviates from αβω (with the strategy τ ′j), by Equation (1) the other players
combine against him and play according to ν−j . By Lemma 15 this coalition wins the
game Gj from any vertex visited by αβω . So the strategy ν−j of the coalition keeps the
play 〈τ ′j , (τi)i∈Π\{j}〉 away from the set Goalj , whatever player j does. Therefore τ
′
j is not
a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π in the game T .
We now prove that (τi)i∈Π is a finite-memory strategy profile. According to the definition
of finite-memory strategy (see Section 2) we have to prove that each relation ≈τi on H has
finite index (recall that h ≈τi h
′ if τi(hδ) = τi(h
′δ) for all δ ∈ V ∗Vi). In this aim we define for
each player i an equivalence relation ∼τi with finite index such that
∀h, h′ ∈ H, h ∼τi h
′ ⇒ h ≈τi h
′.
We first define an equivalence relation ∼P with finite index related to the punishment
function P . For all prefixes h, h′ of αβω , i.e. such that no player is punished, this relation
does not distinguish two histories that are identical except for a certain number of cycles β.
For the other histories it just has to remember the first player, say i, who has deviated. The
definition of ∼P is as follows:
h ∼P h
′ if h = αβlβ′, h′ = αβmβ′, β′ < β, l,m ≥ 0
hv ∼P h
′v′ if v, v′ ∈ Vi, h, h
′ < αβω , but hv, h′v′ 6< αβω
hv ∼P hvδ if h < αβ
ω , hv 6< αβω , δ ∈ V ∗.
The relation ∼P is an equivalence relation on H with finite index.
We now turn to the definition of ∼τi . It is based on the definition of τi (given in (1))
and ∼P . To get an equivalence with finite index we proceed as follows. Recall that each
strategy νi,P (h) is memoryless and when a player plays arbitrarily, his strategy is also me-
moryless. Furthermore notice that, in the definition of τi, the strategy σi is only applied to
histories h with length |h| < d. For histories h such that τi(h) = v with hv < αβω , it is enough
to remember information with respect to αβ as already done for ∼P . Therefore for h, h′ ∈ H
we define ∼τi in the following way:
h ∼τi h
′ if h ∼P h
′ and
(
P (h) = ⊥
or P (h) = i and Last(h) = Last(h′)
or P (h) 6= ⊥, i, P (h) > k and Last(h) = Last(h′)
or P (h) 6= ⊥, i, P (h) ≤ k, |h|, |h′| ≥ d and
Last(h) = Last(h′)
)
.
Notice that this relation satisfies
h ∼τi h
′ ⇒ τi(h) = τi(h
′) and Last(h) = Last(h′)
and has finite index. Therefore if h ∼τi h
′, then h ≈τi h
′ and the relation ≈τi has finite index.
⊓⊔
We can now proceed to the proof of Proposition 13.
Proof (of Proposition 13). Let us set Π = {1, . . . , n} and d = (n+ 1) · 2 · |V |. Let (σi)i∈Π be
a Nash equilibrium in the game Truncd(T ) and ρ its outcome.
To be able to use Lemma 16, we consider the prefix pq of ρ of minimal length such that
∃ l ≥ 1 |p| = (l − 1) · |V |
|pq| = (l + 1) · |V |
Visit(p) = Visit(pq) . (2)
The following statements are true.
• l ≤ 2 · n+ 1.
• If Visit(p)  Visit(ρ), then l < 2 · n+ 1.
Indeed the first statement results from the fact that in the worst case, the play ρ visits the
goal set of a new player in each prefix of length i · 2 · |V |, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i.e. |p| = n · 2 · |V |. It
follows that pq exists as a prefix of ρ, because the length d of ρ is equal to (n+ 1) · 2 · |V | by
hypothesis. Thus Visit(p) ⊆ Visit(ρ). Suppose that there exists i ∈ Visit(ρ) \ Visit(p), then ρ
visit Goali after the prefix pq by Equation (2). The second statement follows easily.
Given the length of q, one vertex of V is visited at least twice by q. More precisely, we can
write
pq = αβγ with Last(α) = Last(αβ)
|α| ≥ (l − 1) · |V |
|αβ| ≤ l · |V | .
In particular, |p| ≤ |α|. See Figure 3. We have Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ), and |αβγ| = (l+1) · |V |.
As the hypotheses of Lemma 16 are verified, we can apply it in this context to get a finite-
memory Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π in the game T with Type((τi)i∈Π) = Visit(α). ⊓⊔
|V |
2·|V |
(l−1)·|V |
l·|V |
(l+1)·|V |
d
α
β
γ
ρ
p
q
Fig. 3. Slicing of the play ρ in the tree Truncd(T ).
Proposition 13 asserts that given a game G and the game Truncd(T ) played on the truncated
tree of T of a well-chosen depth d, one can lift any Nash equilibrium (σi)i∈Π of Truncd(T ) to
a Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π of G. The proof of Proposition 13 states that the type of (τi)i∈Π
is equal to Visit(α). We give an example that shows that it is impossible to preserve the type
of the lifted Nash equilibrium (σi)i∈Π .
Example 17. Let us consider the two-player game G depicted in Figure 4 with Goal1 =
{C}, Goal2 = {E}. One can show that G admits only Nash equilibria of type {2} or ∅.
Indeed, on one hand, there is no play of G where both goals are visited, and on the other
hand given a strategy profile (σi)i∈Π such that 〈(σi)i∈Π〉 visits Goal1 (i.e. 〈(σi)i∈Π〉 is of the
form A+BCω), playing D instead of C is clearly a profitable deviation for player 2.
We will now see that for each d ≥ 2 the game played on Truncd(T ) admits a Nash equi-
librium of type {1}. From the above discussion, this equilibrium can not be lifted to a Nash
equilibrium of the same type in G. A truncated tree Truncd(T ) is depicted in Figure 5. One
can show that the strategy profile leading to the outcome Ad−1BC (depicted in bold in the
figure) is a Nash equilibrium in Truncd(T ) of type {1}. Following the lines of the proof of
Proposition 13, we see that this Nash equilibrium is lifted to a Nash equilibrium of G with
outcome Aω and type ∅.
On the other hand, notice that from the proof of Proposition 13, we can construct a Nash
equilibrium such that each player pays either an infinite cost, or a cost bounded by |Π | ·2 · |V |.
3.2 Nash Equilibria with Finite Memory Preserving Types
In this section we show that given a Nash equilibrium, we can construct another Nash equi-
librium with the same type such that all its strategies are finite-memory. We then answer to
Problem 2 for Nash equilibria.
Theorem 18. If there exists a Nash equilibrium in a quantitative multiplayer reachability
game G, then there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium of the same type in G.
The proof is based on two steps. The first step constructs from (σi)i∈Π another Nash
equilibrium (τi)i∈Π with the same type such that the play 〈(τi)i∈Π〉 is of the form αβω
with Visit(α) = Type((σi)i∈Π). This is possible thanks to Lemmas 19 and 20, by first elimi-
nating unnecessary cycles in the play 〈(σi)i∈Π〉 and then locating a prefix αβ such that β is
a cycle that can be infinitely repeated.
A B C
D E
Fig. 4. A game G.
d
A
A B
A B C D
A B C D C E
A
A B
A B C D
AB CD C E
Fig. 5. The truncated tree Truncd(T ).
The second step transforms the Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π into a finite-memory one thanks
to Lemma 16 given in Section 3.1. For that purpose, we consider the strategy profile (τi)i∈Π
limited to the tree T truncated at a well-chosen depth.
The next lemma indicates how to eliminate a cycle in the outcome of a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 19. Let (σi)i∈Π be a strategy profile in a game G and ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉 its outcome.
Suppose that ρ = pqρ˜, where q contains at least one vertex, such that
Visit(p) = Visit(pq)
Last(p) = Last(pq).
We define a strategy profile (τi)i∈Π as follows:
τi(h) =
{
σi(h) if p 6≤ h,
σi(pqδ) if h = pδ
where h is a history of G with Last(h) ∈ Vi. We get the outcome 〈(τi)i∈Π〉 = pρ˜.
If a strategy τ ′j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π , then there exists a profitable
deviation σ′j for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π .
Proof. Let us set Π = {1, . . . , n}. We write
ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉 of cost profile (x1, . . . , xn),
π = 〈(τi)i∈Π〉 of cost profile (y1, . . . , yn).
We observe that as ρ = pqρ˜, we have π = pρ˜ (see Figures 6 and 7). It follows that
∀i ∈ Π, yi ≤ xi. (3)
More precisely,
- if xi = +∞, then yi = +∞; (4)
- if xi < +∞ and i ∈ Visit(p), then yi = xi;
- if xi < +∞ and i 6∈ Visit(p), then yi = xi − (|q|+ 1). (5)
ρ=〈(σi)i∈Π 〉
ρ′
1
ρ′
2
p
q
ρ˜
Fig. 6. Play ρ and possible deviations.
pi=〈(τi)i∈Π 〉
pi′
1
pi′
2
p
q
ρ˜
Fig. 7. Play pi and possible deviations.
Let τ ′j be a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π , and π
′ be the outcome of the
strategy profile (τ ′j , (τi)i∈Π\{j}). Then
Costj(π
′) < yj.
We show how to construct a profitable deviation σ′j for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π . Two cases
occur:
(i) player j deviates from π just after a proper prefix h of p (like for the play π′1 in Figure 7).
We define σ′j = τ
′
j and we denote by ρ
′ the outcome of (σ′j , (σi)i∈Π\{j}). Given the defini-
tion of the strategy profile (τi)i∈Π , one can verify that ρ
′ = π′ (see the play ρ′1 in Figure 6).
Thus
Costj(ρ
′) = Costj(π
′) < yj ≤ xj
by Equation (3), which implies that σ′j is a profitable deviation of player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π .
(ii) player j deviates from π after the prefix p (π and π′ coincide at least on p).
This case is illustrated by the play π′2 in Figure 7. We define for all histories h ending in
a vertex of Vj :
σ′j(h) =
{
σj(h) if pq 6≤ h,
τ ′j(pδ) if h = pqδ.
Let us set ρ′ = 〈σ′j , (σi)i∈Π\{j}〉. As player j deviates after p with the strategy τ
′
j , one can
prove that
π′ = pπ˜′ and ρ′ = pqπ˜′
by definition of (τi)i∈Π (see the play ρ
′
2 in Figure 6). As Costj(π
′) < yj , it means that j 6∈
Visit(p) (otherwise the deviation would not be profitable for player j). Since Visit(p) =
Visit(pq), we also have
Costj(π
′) + (|q|+ 1) = Costj(ρ
′).
By Equations (4) and (5), we get
– either xj = yj = +∞ and Costj(ρ′) < xj ,
– or xj = yj + (|q|+ 1) and Costj(ρ′) < xj ,
which proves that σ′j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π . ⊓⊔
While Lemma 19 deals with elimination of unnecessary cycles, Lemma 20 deals with rep-
etition of a useful cycle.
Lemma 20. Let (σi)i∈Π be a strategy profile in a game G and ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉 its outcome. We
assume that ρ = pqρ˜, where q contains at least one vertex, such that
Visit(p) = Visit(ρ)
Last(p) = Last(pq).
We define a strategy profile (τi)i∈Π as follows:
τi(h) =
{
σi(h) if p 6≤ h,
σi(pδ) if h = pq
kδ, k ∈ N, and q 6≤ δ
where h is a history of G with Last(h) ∈ Vi. We get the outcome 〈(τi)i∈Π〉 = pqω.
If a strategy τ ′j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π , then there exists a profitable
deviation σ′j for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π .
Proof. We use the same notations as in the proof of Lemma 19. Here we have xi = yi for
all i ∈ Π since Visit(p) = Visit(ρ). One can prove that π = pqω (see Figures 8 and 9).
p
q
ρ˜
ρ=〈(σi)i∈Π 〉
Fig. 8. Play ρ and its prefix pq.
p
q
pi=〈(τi)i∈Π 〉
q
q
q
Fig. 9. Play pi = pqω.
We show how to define a profitable deviation σ′j from the deviation τ
′
j . We distinguish the
following two cases:
(i) player j deviates from π just after a proper prefix h of pq.
We define σ′j = τ
′
j . As in the first case of the proof of Lemma 19, we have Costj(ρ
′) < xj ,
which implies that σ′j is a profitable deviation of player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π .
(ii) player j deviates from π after the prefix pq, i.e. after a prefix pqk and strictly before the
prefix pqk+1 (k ≥ 1).
We define for all histories h ending in a vertex of Vj :
σ′j(h) =
{
σj(h) if p 6≤ h,
τ ′j(pq
kδ) if h = pδ.
One can prove that
π′ = pqkπ˜′ and ρ′ = pπ˜′.
And then, in the point of view of costs we have
Costj(ρ
′) < Costj(π
′) < yj = xj ,
which proves that σ′j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π . ⊓⊔
The next proposition achieves the first step of the proof of Theorem 18 as mentioned in
Section 3.2. It shows that one can construct from a Nash equilibrium another Nash equilibrium
with the same type and with an outcome of the form αβω . Its proof uses Lemmas 19 and 20.
Proposition 21. Let (σi)i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in a game G. Then there exists a Nash
equilibrium (τi)i∈Π with the same type and such that 〈(τi)i∈Π〉 = αβω, where Visit(α) =
Type((σi)i∈Π) and |αβ| < (|Π |+ 1) · |V |.
Proof. Let us set Π = {1, . . . , n} and ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉. Without loss of generality suppose that
Cost(ρ) = (x1, . . . , xn) such that x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xk < +∞
and xk+1 = . . . = xn = +∞
where 0 ≤ k ≤ n. We consider two cases:
(i) x1 ≥ |V |.
Then, there exists a prefix pq of ρ, with q containing at least one vertex, such that
|pq| < x1
Visit(p) = Visit(pq) = ∅
Last(p) = Last(pq).
We define the strategy profile (τi)i∈Π as proposed in Lemma 19. By this lemma it is
actually a Nash equilibrium in G. With π = 〈(τi)i∈Π〉, we have
ρ = pqρ˜ and π = pρ˜.
Thus if the cost profile for the play π is (y1, . . . , yn), we have
y1 < x1, . . . , yk < xk
yk+1 = xk+1 = +∞, . . . , yn = xn = +∞.
(ii) (xl+1 − xl) ≥ |V | for 1 ≤ l ≤ k − 1.
Then, there exists a prefix pq of ρ, with q containing at least one vertex, such that
xl < |pq| < xl+1
Visit(p) = Visit(pq) = {1, . . . , l}
Last(p) = Last(pq).
We define the strategy profile (τi)i∈Π given in Lemma 19. It is then a Nash equilibrium
in G, and for π = 〈(τi)i∈Π〉, we have
ρ = pqρ˜ and π = pρ˜.
Hence if the cost profile for the play π is (y1, . . . , yn), we have
y1 = x1, . . . , yl = xl;
yl+1 < xl+1, . . . , yk < xk;
yk+1 = xk+1 = +∞, . . . , yn = xn = +∞.
By applying finitely many times the two previous cases, we can assume without loss of gener-
ality that (σi)i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium with a cost profile (x1, . . . , xn) such that
xi < i · |V | for i ≤ k;
xi = +∞ for i > k.
Let us go further. We can write ρ = αβρ˜ such that
Visit(α) = Visit(ρ)
Last(α) = Last(αβ)
|αβ| < (k + 1) · |V | ≤ (n+ 1) · |V |.
Indeed, the prefix h of ρ of length (k+ 1) · |V | visits each goal set Goali, with i ≤ k, and after
the last visited Goalk, there remains enough vertices to observe a cycle. Notice that Visit(α) =
Visit(αβ) = Visit(ρ) (= Type((σi)i∈Π)).
If we define the strategy profile (τi)i∈Π like in Lemma 20, we get a Nash equilibrium in G
with outcome αβω and the same type as (σi)i∈Π . ⊓⊔
We are now ready to prove Theorem 18.
Proof (of Theorem 18). Let us set Π = {1, . . . , n}. Let (σi)i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in the
game G. The first step consists in constructing a Nash equilibrium as in Proposition 21. Let us
denote it again by (σi)i∈Π . Let us set ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉 = αβω such that Visit(α) = Type((σi)i∈Π)
and |αβ| < (n+1) · |V |. The strategy profile (σi)i∈Π is also a Nash equilibrium in the game T
played on the unraveling T of G.
For the second step we consider Truncd(T ) the truncated tree of T of depth d = (n+2)· |V |.
It is clear that the strategy profile (σi)i∈Π limited to this tree is also a Nash equilibrium
of Truncd(T ).
We know that |αβ| < (n+1)·|V | and we set γ such that αβγ is a prefix of ρ and |αβγ| = (n+
2) · |V |. Furthermore we have Last(α) = Last(αβ) and Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ) (since Visit(α) =
Type(ρ)). Then this prefix αβγ satisfies the properties described in Lemma 15 (by setting l =
n + 1). By Lemma 16 we conclude that there exists a Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π with finite
memory such that Type((τi)i∈Π) = Visit(α), that is, with the same type as the initial Nash
equilibrium (σi)i∈Π . ⊓⊔
4 Secure Equilibria
In the previous section, we positively solved Problem 1 and Problem 2 for Nash equilibria.
We here solve these two problems for secure equilibria, but in two-player games only. The
main results are stated in Theorems 22 and 28 below. In this section, we exclusively consider
two-player games.
Theorem 22. In every quantitative two-player reachability game, there exists a finite-memory
secure equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 22 is based on the same ideas as for the proof of Theorem 10
(existence of a Nash equilibrium). By Kuhn’s theorem (Theorem 11), there exists a secure
equilibrium in the game Truncd(T ) played on the finite tree Truncd(T ), for any depth d. By
choosing an adequate depth d, Proposition 25 enables to extend this secure equilibrium to a
secure equilibrium in the infinite tree T , and thus in G.
The notion of secure equilibrium is based on the binary relations≺j of Definition 3. One can
easily see that ≺j is not reflexive. To be able to apply Kuhn’s theorem, it is more convenient to
define secure equilibria via a preference relation. Given two cost profiles (x1, x2) and (y1, y2):
(x1, x2) -j (y1, y2) iff (x1, x2) ≺j (y1, y2) ∨ (x1 = y1 ∧ x2 = y2) .
The relation -j is clearly a preference relation
7. We can now provide an equivalent definition
of secure equilibrium.
Proposition 23. A strategy profile (σ1, σ2) of a game G is a secure equilibrium iff for all
strategies σ′1 of player 1 in G, we have:
Cost(ρ′) -1 Cost(ρ)
where ρ = 〈σ1, σ2〉 and ρ′ = 〈σ′1, σ2〉, and symmetrically for all strategies σ
′
2 of player 2.
Since -1 and -2 are preference relations, we get the next corollary by Kuhn’s theorem.
Corollary 24. Let G be a quantitative two-player reachability game and T be the unraveling
of G. Let Truncd(T ) be the game played on the truncated tree of T of depth d, with d ≥ 0.
Then there exists a secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ).
Now that we can guarantee the existence of secure equilibrium in finite trees, it remains
to show how to lift them to infinite trees. The next proposition states that it is possible to
extend a secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ) to a secure equilibrium in the game T with the same
type, if the depth d is greater or equal to (|Π |+ 1) · 2 · |V | and there are only two players. It
also says that we can construct a secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ) from a secure equilibrium
in T , while keeping the same type.
Proposition 25. Let G be a two-player game and T be the unraveling of G.
(i) If there exists a secure equilibrium of a certain type in the game T , then there exists a secure
equilibrium of the same type in the game Truncd(T ), for some depth d ≥ (|Π |+1) · 2 · |V |.
(ii) If there exists a secure equilibrium of a certain type in the game Truncd(T ), where d ≥
(|Π |+ 1) · 2 · |V |, then there exists a finite-memory secure equilibrium of the same type in
the game T .
To prove Proposition 25, we need the following technical lemma whose hypotheses are the
same as in Lemma 15. Recall that Lemma 15 states that for all j ∈ Π such that α does not
visit Goalj , the players i 6= j can play together to prevent player j from reaching his goal
set Goalj from any history hu consistent with (σi)i∈Π\{j} and such that |hu| ≤ |αβ|. We
denote by ν−j the memoryless winning strategy of the coalition, and for each player i 6= j, νi,j
the memoryless strategy of player i in G induced by ν−j .
7 Remark that -j is a kind of lexicographic order on (N ∪ {+∞}) × (N ∪ {+∞}).
Lemma 26. Suppose d ≥ 0. Let (σ1, σ2) be a secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ) and ρ = 〈σ1, σ2〉
its outcome. Assume that ρ has a prefix αβγ, where β contains at least one vertex, such that
Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ)
Last(α) = Last(αβ)
|αβ| ≤ l · |V |
|αβγ| = (l + 1) · |V |
for some l ≥ 1. Then we have
(Visit(α) 6= ∅ ∨ Visit(ρ) 6= {1, 2})⇒ Visit(α) = Visit(ρ).
In particular, Lemma 26 implies that if α visits none of the goal sets, then ρ visits either
both goal sets or none. Notice that in the case of Nash equilibria, we can have situations con-
tradicting Lemma 26, and in particular the previous situation, as it can be seen in Example 17.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that 2 ∈ Visit(ρ) \ Visit(α) (the case where 1 ∈ Visit(ρ) \
Visit(α) is symmetric). The hypothesis implies that 1 ∈ Visit(α) or 1 6∈ Visit(ρ).
By Lemma 15, player 1 wins the game G2 from Last(α), that is, has a memoryless winning
strategy ν1,2 from this vertex. Then if player 1 plays according to σ1 until depth |α|, and
then switches to ν1,2 from Last(α), this strategy is a ≺1-profitable deviation for player 1
w.r.t. (σ1, σ2). Indeed, if 1 ∈ Visit(α), player 1 manages to increase player 2’s cost while
keeping his own cost. On the other hand, if 1 6∈ Visit(ρ), either player 1 succeeds in reaching
his goal set (i.e. strictly decreasing his cost), or he does not reach it (then gets the same cost
as in ρ) but succeeds in increasing player 2’s cost. Thus we get a contradiction. ⊓⊔
We can now give the proof of Proposition 25. The idea for showing case (i) is to look at
the play π of the secure equilibrium in T and consider the depth d needed to visit all the goal
sets of the players in Visit(π). Then, the secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ) is defined exactly as
the secure equilibrium of T .
The proof of case (ii) works pretty much as the one of Proposition 13 (whereas the latter
proposition does not preserve the type of the Nash equilibrium). Thanks to Lemma 26, the
proof reduces into only two cases depending on when the goal sets are visited. In the most
interesting case, a well-chosen prefix αβ, with β being a cycle, is first extracted from the
outcome ρ of the secure equilibrium (σ1, σ2) of Truncd(T ). The outcome of the required secure
equilibrium of T will be equal to αβω. As soon as a player deviates from this play, the other
player punishes him, but the way to define the punishment is here more involved than in the
proof of Proposition 13. In the other case, the proof is simpler, but the ideas are quite the
same.
Before entering the details, let us introduce a notation. For any play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . of G and
any player i ∈ Π , we define Indexi(ρ) as the least index l such that ρl ∈ Goali if it exists, or
−1 if not8.
Proof (of Proposition 25). First let us begin with the proof of (i). Suppose that there exists
a secure equilibrium (τ1, τ2) in T and that the play π is the outcome of this strategy profile.
Let us set d := max{(|Π |+1) · 2 · |V |, Index1(π), Index2(π)} and define (σ1, σ2) as the strategy
profile in Truncd(T ) corresponding to the strategies (τ1, τ2) restricted to the finite tree. Clearly
8 We are conscious that it is counterintuitive to use the particular value −1, but it is helpful in the
proofs.
the outcome ρ of (σ1, σ2) is a prefix of π and Visit(ρ) = Visit(π), so (σ1, σ2) and (τ1, τ2) are of
the same type. It remains to show that (σ1, σ2) is a secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ).
Assume by contradiction that player 1 has a ≺1-profitable deviation σ′1 w.r.t. (σ1, σ2) (the
case of player 2 is symmetric). We write ρ′ for the outcome of (σ′1, σ2) in Truncd(T ). There
are two cases to consider: either player 1 manages to decrease his cost in ρ′ w.r.t. ρ, or he
pays the same cost as in ρ but he is able to increase the cost of player 2 in ρ′ w.r.t. ρ. In
both cases, if player 1 plays according to σ′1 in T until depth d and then arbitrarily, one can
easily be convinced that we get a ≺1-profitable deviation
9 w.r.t. (τ1, τ2) in T .This leads to a
contradiction.
Now let us proceed to the proof of (ii). Let (σ1, σ2) be a secure equilibrium in the
game Truncd(T ), where d ≥ (|Π | + 1) · 2 · |V |, and ρ its outcome. We define the prefixes pq
and αβγ as in the proof of Proposition 13 (see Figure 3).
By Lemma 26 there are only two cases to consider:
(a) Visit(α) = ∅ and Visit(ρ) = {1, 2};
(b) Visit(α) = Visit(ρ).
We define a different secure equilibrium according to the case.
Let us start with case (a): Visit(α) = ∅ and Visit(ρ) = {1, 2}. We define the following
strategy profile:
τi(h) =
{
σi(h) if |h| < max{Index1(ρ), Index2(ρ)},
arbitrary otherwise.
where i = 1, 2, and arbitrary means that the next vertex is chosen arbitrarily, but in a memo-
ryless way. Note that the outcome of (τ1, τ2) is of the form α
′(β′)ω where Visit(α′) = Visit(ρ) =
{1, 2} and β′ is a cycle. So, (τ1, τ2) has the same type as (σ1, σ2). It remains to prove that
(τ1, τ2) is a finite-memory secure equilibrium in T .
Assume by contradiction that player 1 has a ≺1-profitable deviation τ ′1 w.r.t. (τ1, τ2) in T
(the case for player 2 is symmetric). The strategy σ′1 equal to τ
′
1 in Truncd(T ) is clearly a ≺1-
profitable deviation w.r.t. (σ1, σ2), which is a contradiction with the fact that (σ1, σ2) is a
secure equilibrium in Truncd(T ). Moreover, as done in the proof of Lemma 16, (τ1, τ2) is a
finite-memory strategy profile.
Now we consider case (b): Visit(α) = Visit(ρ). Like in the proof of Lemma 16 we consider
the infinite play αβω in the game T . The basic idea of the strategy profile (τ1, τ2) is the
same as for the Nash equilibrium case: player 2 (resp. 1) plays according to αβω and punishes
player 1 (resp. 2) if he deviates from αβω , in the following way. Suppose that player 1 deviates
(the case for player 2 is similar). Then player 2 plays according to σ2 until depth |α|, and after
that, he plays arbitrarily if α visits Goal1, otherwise he plays according to ν2,1.
We define the same punishment function P as in the proof of Lemma 16: for v0, we define
P (v0) = ⊥ and for h ∈ V + such that Last(h) ∈ Vi and v ∈ V , we let:
P (hv) =


⊥ if P (h) = ⊥ and hv < αβω ,
i if P (h) = ⊥ and hv 6< αβω ,
P (h) otherwise (P (h) 6= ⊥).
9 Notice that in the second case, when ρ does not visit Goal1 in Truncd(T ), player 1 may reach his
goal set in T when deviating in this way, and this would be profitable for him in this game.
The definition of the secure equilibrium (τ1, τ2) is as follows: for h ∈ H such that Last(h) ∈
Vi:
τi(h) =


v if P (h) = ⊥ (h < αβω); such that hv < αβω ,
arbitrary if P (h) = i,
σi(h) if P (h) 6= ⊥, i and |h| ≤ |α|,
νi,P (h)(h) if P (h) 6= ⊥, i, |h| > |α| and α does not visit GoalP (h),
arbitrary otherwise (P (h) 6= ⊥, i, |h| > |α| and α visits GoalP (h))
where i = 1, 2, and arbitrary means that the next vertex is chosen arbitrarily (in a memo-
ryless way). Clearly the outcome of (τ1, τ2) is the play αβ
ω , and the type of (τ1, τ2) is equal
to Visit(α) = Visit(ρ), the type of (σ1, σ2). Moreover, as done in the proof of Lemma 16, (τ1, τ2)
is a finite-memory strategy profile.
Remark that the definition of the strategy profile (τ1, τ2) is a little different from the one
in the proof of Lemma 16 because here, if player 1 deviates (for example), then player 2 has to
prevent him from reaching his goal set Goal1 (faster), or having the same cost but succeeding
in increasing player 2’s cost.
It remains to show that (τ1, τ2) is a secure equilibrium in the game T . Assume by con-
tradiction that there exists a ≺1-profitable deviation τ ′1 for player 1 w.r.t. (τ1, τ2). The case
of a ≺2-profitable deviation τ ′2 for player 2 is similar. We construct a play ρ
′ in Truncd(T ) as
follows: player 1 plays according to the strategy τ ′1 restricted to Truncd(T ) (denoted by σ
′
1)
and player 2 plays according to σ2. Thus the play ρ
′ coincide with the play π′ = 〈τ ′1, τ2〉 at
least until depth |α| (by definition of τ2); it can differ afterwards. We have:
ρ = 〈σ1, σ2〉 of cost profile (x1, x2)
ρ′ = 〈σ′1, σ2〉 of cost profile (x
′
1, x
′
2)
π = 〈τ1, τ2〉 of cost profile (y1, y2)
π′ = 〈τ ′1, τ2〉 of cost profile (y
′
1, y
′
2).
The situation is depicted in Figure 10.
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Fig. 10. Plays ρ and pi, and their respective deviations ρ′ and pi′.
By contradiction, we assumed that τ ′1 is a ≺1-profitable deviation for player 1 w.r.t. (τ1, τ2),
i.e. (y1, y2) ≺1 (y′1, y
′
2). Now we are going to show that (x1, x2) ≺1 (x
′
1, x
′
2), meaning that σ
′
1
is a ≺1-profitable deviation for player 1 w.r.t. (σ1, σ2) in Truncd(T ). This will lead to the
contradiction. As τ ′1 is a ≺1-profitable deviation w.r.t. (τ1, τ2), one of the following three cases
stands.
(1) y′1 < y1 < +∞.
As π = αβω , it means that α visits F1, and then:
y′1 < y1 = x1 ≤ |α|.
As y′1 < |α|, we have x
′
1 = y
′
1 (as ρ
′ and π′ coincide until depth |α|). Therefore x′1 < x1,
and (x1, x2) ≺1 (x′1, x
′
2).
(2) y′1 < y1 = +∞.
If y′1 ≤ |α|, we have x
′
1 = y
′
1 (by the same argument as before). As Visit(α) = Visit(ρ), we
have x1 = y1 = +∞ and x′1 < x1 (and so (x1, x2) ≺1 (x
′
1, x
′
2)).
We show that the case y′1 > |α| is impossible. By definition of τ2 the play π
′ is consistent
with σ2 until depth |α|, and then with ν2,1 (as y1 = +∞). By Lemma 15 the play π′ can
not visit Goal1 after a depth > |α|.
(3) y1 = y
′
1 and y2 < y
′
2.
Note that this implies y2 < +∞ and x2 = y2 (as π = αβω). Since ρ′ and π′ coincide until
depth |α|, y2 < y′2 and x2 = y2 ≤ |α|, we have
x2 = y2 < x
′
2
showing that the cost of player 2 is increased. In order to ensure that σ′1 is a ≺1-profitable
deviation, it remains to show that either player 1 keeps the same cost, or he decreases his
cost.
If y′1 = y1 < +∞, it follows as in the first case that:
y1 = x1 ≤ |α| and x
′
1 = y
′
1.
Therefore x1 = x
′
1, i.e. player 1 has the same cost in ρ and ρ
′. And so, (x1, x2) ≺1 (x′1, x
′
2).
On the contrary, if y′1 = y1 = +∞, it follows that x1 = +∞ (as Visit(α) = Visit(ρ)).
And so, we have that x′1 < +∞ = x1, or x
′
1 = x1. But in both cases, it holds that
(x1, x2) ≺1 (x′1, x
′
2).
In conclusion, we constructed a ≺1-profitable deviation σ
′
1 w.r.t. (σ1, σ2) in Truncd(T ), and
then we get a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Remark 27. Let us notice that in case (i) of Proposition 25, the proof remains valid if we
take d = max{0, Index1(π), Index2(π)}. Thus, in the statement of case (i), the constraint d ≥
(|Π |+ 1) · 2 · |V | can be replaced by d ≥ 0.
We can now proceed to the proof of Theorem 22.
Proof (of Theorem 22). Let us set d := (Π + 1) · 2 · |V | and apply Corollary 24 on the
game Truncd(T ). Then we get a secure equilibrium in this game. By Proposition 25 there
exists in G a finite-memory secure equilibrium with the same type. ⊓⊔
Theorem 22 positively answers to Problem 1 for secure equilibria in two-player games. The
next theorem solves Problem 2 for the same kind of games.
Theorem 28. If there exists a secure equilibrium in a quantitative two-player reachability
game G, then there exists a finite-memory secure equilibrium of the same type in G.
Proof. Let (σ1, σ2) be a secure equilibrium in G. By the first part of Proposition 25, there
exists a secure equilibrium of the same type in the game Truncd(T ), for a certain depth d ≥
(Π + 1) · 2 · |V |. If we apply the second part of Proposition 25, we get a finite-memory secure
equilibrium of the same type as (σ1, σ2) in G. ⊓⊔
The proof of Theorem 28 is based on Proposition 25 which, roughly speaking, ensures that
every secure equilibrium of Truncd(T ) can be lifted to a secure equilibrium of the same type
in T , and conversely. Notice that Proposition 25 has no counterpart for Nash equilibria, since
we can not guarantee that the type can be preserved, as it can be seen from Example 17. This
approach makes the proof of Theorem 28 rather different than the proof of Theorem 18.
Notice that Proposition 25 stands for two-player games because its proof uses Lemma 26
that has been proved only for two players.
5 Extensions of the Model
5.1 Safety Objectives
Let us now consider quantitative games played on a graph where some players have reachability
objectives, whereas others have safety objectives. As previously, the players with reachability
objectives want to reach their goal set as soon as possible. The players with safety objectives
want to avoid their bad set or, if impossible, delay its visit as long as possible. Let us make
that precise through the following definition.
Definition 29. An infinite turn-based quantitative multiplayer reachability/safety game is a
tuple G = (Π,Πr, Πs, V, (Vi)i∈Π , v0, E, (Goali)i∈Πr , (Badi)i∈Πs) where
• Π is a finite set of players partitioned into Πr and Πs which are the players with reacha-
bility and safety objectives respectively,
• G = (V, (Vi)i∈Π , v0, E) is a finite directed graph where V is the set of vertices, (Vi)i∈Π
is a partition of V into the state sets of each player, v0 ∈ V is the initial vertex, and
E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges, and
• Goali ⊆ V is the goal set of player i, for i ∈ Πr; Badi ⊆ V is the bad set of player i, for
i ∈ Πs.
For any play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . of G, we note Costi(ρ) the cost of player i. For i ∈ Πr the cost
is defined as before and for i ∈ Πs the cost is defined by:
Costi(ρ) =
{
−l if l is the least index such that ρl ∈ Badi,
−∞ otherwise.
As before, the aim of each player i is to minimize his cost, i.e. reach his goal set Goali as soon
as possible for i ∈ Πr, or delay the visit of Badi as long as possible for i ∈ Πs. The notions
of play, strategy, outcome and Nash equilibrium extend in a natural way. The main result of
this subsection is the following theorem which solves Problem 1 in this framework.
Theorem 30. In every quantitative multiplayer reachability/safety game, there exists a finite-
memory Nash equilibrium.
In order to prove Theorem 30, we have to revisit the results of Section 3. Let us first notice
that Lemma 15 remains true in this framework when player j belongs to Πr. Lemma 16
remains true, however we have to slightly adapt its proof.
Proof (of Lemma 16 in the case of reachability/safety objectives).
Let us first introduce some notations. In the rest of the proof, we denote by Πfr (resp. Π
f
s )
the subset of players i ∈ Πr (resp. i ∈ Πs) such that α visits Goali (resp. Badi) and by Π∞r
(resp. Π∞s ) the set Πr \Π
f
r (resp. Πs \Π
f
s ).
The punishment function P is defined exactly as in the proof of Lemma 16. For v0, we
define P (v0) = ⊥ and for h ∈ V + such that Last(h) ∈ Vi and v ∈ V , we let:
P (hv) =


⊥ if P (h) = ⊥ and hv < αβω ,
i if P (h) = ⊥ and hv 6< αβω ,
P (h) otherwise (P (h) 6= ⊥) .
The difference with the proof of Lemma 16 arises in the definition of the Nash equilib-
rium (τi)i∈Π . The new equilibrium needs to incorporate an adequate punishment for the
players with safety objectives. More precisely, in order to dissuade a player j ∈ Πfs from devi-
ating, the other players punish him by playing the strategies (σi)i∈Π\{j} in Truncd(T ). Notice
that a player j ∈ Π∞s has no incentive to deviate. Formally we define the Nash equilibrium
(τi)i∈Π as follows. For h ∈ H such that Last(h) ∈ Vi,
τi(h) =


v if P (h) = ⊥ (h < αβω); such that hv < αβω ,
arbitrary if P (h) = i,
νi,P (h)(h) if P (h) 6= ⊥, i and P (h) ∈ Π
∞
r ,
σi(h) if P (h) 6= ⊥, i, P (h) ∈ Πfr ∪Π
f
s and |h| < d,
arbitrary otherwise,
(6)
where arbitrary means that the next vertex is chosen arbitrarily (in a memoryless way). Clearly
the outcome of (τi)i∈Π is the play αβ
ω, and Type((τi)i∈Π) is equal to Visit(α) (= Visit(αβ)).
It remains to prove that (τi)i∈Π is a finite-memory Nash equilibrium in the game T . In
order to do so, we prove that none of the players has a profitable deviation. For players with
reachability objectives, the arguments are exactly the same as the ones provided in the proof
of Lemma 16. Let us now consider players with safety objectives. In the case where j ∈ Π∞s ,
player j has clearly no incentive to deviate. In the case where j ∈ Πfs , to decrease his cost,
player j has no incentive to deviate after the prefix α. Thus we assume that the strategy τ ′j
causes a deviation from a vertex visited in α. By Equation (6) the other players first play
according to (σi)i∈Π\{j} in Truncd(T ), and then in an arbitrary way.
Suppose that τ ′j is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π in the game T . Let us
set π = 〈(τi)i∈Π〉 and π′ = 〈τ ′j , (τi)i∈Π\{j}〉. Then
Costj(π
′) < Costj(π).
On the other hand we know that
Costj(π) = Costj(ρ) ≤ |α|.
So if we limit the play π′ in T to its prefix of length d, we get a play ρ′ in Truncd(T ) such that
Costj(ρ
′) ≤ Costj(π
′) < Costj(ρ).
Notice that we do not necessarily have that Costj(ρ
′) = Costj(π
′) (as in the proof of Lemma 16)
since the bad set Badj can be visited by π
′ and not by ρ′. As the play ρ′ is consistent with
the strategies (σi)i∈Π\{j} by Equation (6), the strategy τ
′
j restricted to the tree Truncd(T ) is
a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π in the game Truncd(T ). This is impossible.
Moreover, as done in the proof of Lemma 16, (τ1, τ2) is a finite-memory strategy profile.
⊓⊔
Since Lemma 16 holds in the context of reachability/safety objectives, Proposition 13
ensures that the equilibrium in Truncd(T ) provided by Kuhn’s theorem (Corollary 12) can be
lifted to T . This proves Theorem 30.
5.2 Tuples of Costs on Edges
In this subsection, we come back to a pure reachability framework and we extend our model
in the following way: we assume that edges are labelled with tuples of positive costs (one cost
for each player). Here we do not only count the number of edges to reach the goal of a player,
but we sum up his costs along the path until his goal is reached. His aim is still to minimize
his global cost for a play. We generalize Definition 1.
Definition 31. An infinite turn-based quantitative multiplayer reachability game with tuples
of costs on edges is a tuple G = (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , v0, E, (Costi)i∈Π , (Goali)i∈Π) where
• Π is a finite set of players,
• G = (V, (Vi)i∈Π , v0, E) is a finite directed graph where V is the set of vertices, (Vi)i∈Π
is a partition of V into the state sets of each player, v0 ∈ V is the initial vertex, and
E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges,
• Costi : E → R>0 is the cost function of player i defined on the edges of the graph,
• Goali ⊆ V is the goal set of player i.
We also positively solve Problem 1 for Nash equilibria in this context.
Theorem 32. In every quantitative multiplayer reachability game with tuples of costs on
edges, there exists a finite-memory Nash equilibrium.
To prove Theorem 32, we follow the same scheme as in Section 3. In particular, we rely
on Kuhn’s theorem (Corollary 12) and need to prove a counterpart of Lemma 15, Lemma 16
and Proposition 13 in this framework.
Let us first introduce some notations that will be useful in this context. We define cmin :=
mini∈Π mine∈E Costi(e), cmax := maxi∈Π maxe∈E Costi(e) and K :=
⌈
cmax
cmin
⌉
. It is clear that
cmin, cmax > 0 and K ≥ 1.
We also adapt the definition of Costi(ρ), the cost of player i for a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . .,
Costi(ρ) =


k=l∑
k=1
Costi((ρk−1, ρk)) if l is the least index such that ρl ∈ Goali,
+∞ otherwise.
The counterpart of Lemma 15 is the following one, taking into account the constant K
defined before.
Lemma 33. Suppose d ≥ 0. Let (σi)i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in Truncd(T ) and ρ the out-
come of (σi)i∈Π . Assume that ρ has a prefix αβγ, where β contains at least one vertex, such
that
Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ)
Last(α) = Last(αβ)
|αβ| ≤ l · |V |
|αβγ| = (l + K) · |V |
for some l ≥ 1.
Let j ∈ Π be such that α does not visit Goalj. Consider the qualitative two-player zero-sum
game Gj = (V, Vj , V \ Vj , E,Goalj). Then for all histories hu of G consistent with (σi)i∈Π\{j}
and such that hu ≤ αβ, the coalition of the players i 6= j wins the game Gj from u.
Proof (Sketch). As for the proof of Lemma 15 we proceed by contradiction and define a play
ρ′ in the very same way. We can deduce that
Indexj(ρ
′) ≤ |hu|+ |V | (by Proposition 14)
≤ (l + 1) · |V | (by hypothesis)
≤ (l + K) · |V | (as K ≥ 1)
≤ d (as αβγ ≤ ρ).
The case where Costj(ρ) = +∞ is solved in the same way. For the other case Costj(ρ) <
+∞, we note cj(hu) the sum of the costs of player j along the prefix hu. We have the following
inequalities (see Figure 11):
Costj(ρ
′) ≤ cj(hu) + cmax · |V |
Costj(ρ) > cj(hu) + cmin · K · |V | (as Indexj(ρ) > (l + K) · |V |)
≥ cj(hu) + cmin ·
cmax
cmin
· |V | (by definition of K)
= cj(hu) + cmax · |V | .
Then we have Costj(ρ
′) < Costj(ρ), and since ρ
′ is consistent with (σi)i∈Π\{j}, the strategy
of player j induced by the play ρ′ is a profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π . This
contradicts the fact that (σi)i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium in the game Truncd(T ). ⊓⊔
The following lemma is the counterpart of Lemma 16.
Lemma 34. Suppose d ≥ 0. Let (σi)i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium in Truncd(T ) and αβγ be a
prefix of ρ = 〈(σi)i∈Π〉 as defined in Lemma 33 where |αβγ| = (l + K) · |V | for some l ≥ 1
such that l ≤ d|V |·K + 1.
Then there exists a Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π in the game T . Moreover (τi)i∈Π is finite-
memory, and Type((τi)i∈Π) = Visit(α).
Proof. We prove this result in the very same way as Lemma 16. The only difference lies in
the case10 j ≤ k when we show that (τi)i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium. We suppose that τ ′j is a
profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (τi)i∈Π in the game T . So we have Costj(π′) < Costj(π),
10 Indeed when j > k, i.e. when player j has not reached his goal set, the coalition punishes him in
the exact same way as Lemma 16 by preventing him from visiting his goal set.
K·|V |
(l−1)·|V |
l·|V |
(l+K)·|V |
d
h
u≤|V |
Goalj
Goalj
ρρ
′
Fig. 11. Plays ρ and ρ′ with their common prefix hu.
where π = 〈(τi)i∈Π〉 and π′ = 〈τ ′j , (τi)i∈Π\{j}〉. As Indexj(π) ≤ |α|, we know that Costj(π) ≤
|α| · cmax. It follows that Costj(π′) < |α| · cmax and
Indexj(π
′) < |α| ·
cmax
cmin
≤ (l − 1) · |V | · K
≤ d (by hypothesis).
The first inequality can be justified as follows. For a contradiction, let us assume that Indexj(π
′) ≥
|α| · cmax
cmin
. It follows that Costj(π
′) ≥ cmin · |α| ·
cmax
cmin
, this contradicts the fact that Costj(π
′) <
|α| · cmax.
As in the proof of Lemma 16, we limit the play π′ in T to its prefix of length d and get a
profitable deviation for player j w.r.t. (σi)i∈Π in the game Truncd(T ), contradicting the fact
that (σi)i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium in Truncd(T ).
Moreover, as done in the proof of Lemma 16, (τ1, τ2) is a finite-memory strategy profile. ⊓⊔
As a consequence of the two previous lemmas, Proposition 13 remains true in this context,
we only have to adjust the depth d of the finite tree.
Proposition 35. Let G be a game and T be the unraveling of G. Let Truncd(T ) be the game
played on the truncated tree of T of depth d = max{(|Π |+1)·(K+1)·|V |, (|Π |·(K+1)+1)·|V |·K}.
If there exists a Nash equilibrium in the game Truncd(T ), then there exists a finite-memory
Nash equilibrium in the game T .
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 13. Let (σi)i∈Π be a Nash equilibrium
in the game Truncd(T ) and ρ its outcome. We consider the prefix pq of ρ of minimal length
such that
∃ l ≥ 1 |p| = (l − 1) · |V |
|pq| = (l + K) · |V |
Visit(p) = Visit(pq).
In the worst case, the play ρ visits the goal set of a new player in each prefix of length i · (K+
1) · |V |, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Π |, i.e. |p| = |Π | · (K+ 1) · |V |. So we know that l ≤ |Π | · (K+ 1) + 1 and pq
exists as a prefix of ρ, because the length d of ρ is greater or equal to (|Π |+ 1) · (K+ 1) · |V |
by hypothesis.
Given the length of q (K ≥ 1), one vertex of V is visited at least twice by q. More precisely,
we can write
pq = αβγ with Last(α) = Last(αβ)
|α| ≥ (l − 1) · |V |
|αβ| ≤ l · |V |.
We have Visit(α) = Visit(αβγ), and |αβγ| = (l + K) · |V |.
Moreover, the following inequality holds:
d ≥ (|Π | · (K+ 1) + 1) · |V | · K ≥ l · |V | · K and so, l ≤
d
|V | · K
.
Then, we can apply Lemma 34 and get a finite-memory Nash equilibrium (τi)i∈Π in the
game T such that Type((τi)i∈Π) = Visit(α). ⊓⊔
Thanks to Corollary 12 and Proposition 35, one can easily deduce Theorem 32.
Let us comment on the depth d chosen in Proposition 35. It is defined as the maximum
between d1 := (|Π | + 1) · (K + 1) · |V | and d2 := (|Π | · (K + 1) + 1) · |V | · K. One can easily
prove that d1 < d2 if and only if K
2 >
|Π|+1
|Π| .
We now investigate an alternative method to handle simple cost functions. More precisely
we only consider cost functions (Costi)i∈Π such that for all i, j ∈ Π we have that Costi = Costj
and Costi : E → N0. In other words, it means that there is a unique non-zero natural cost on
every edge. Later on we are going to compare the depths of the finite trees obtained by the
two methods.
In the case of these simple cost functions, we can directly deduce Theorem 32 by replacing
any edge of cost c by a path of length c composed of c new edges (of cost 1) and then applying
the results of Section 3 on this new game. If we write G′ = (Π,V ′, (V ′i )i∈Π , v0, E
′, (Goali)i∈Π)
the new game obtained by adding new vertices and edges when necessary, it holds that:
|V ′| ≤ |V |+ (cmax − 1) · |E|
≤ |V |+ (cmax − 1) · |V |
2, and
|E′| ≤ cmax · |E| .
If we apply Proposition 13, the depth d′ of the finite tree that is considered satisfies:
d′ = (|Π |+ 1) · 2 · |V ′|
≤ (|Π |+ 1) · 2 · (|V |+ (cmax − 1) · |E|)
≤ (|Π |+ 1) · 2 ·
(
|V |+ (cmax − 1) · |V |
2
)
.
Whereas if we apply Proposition 35 directly on the initial game G, we have the following
equality:
d = max{(|Π |+ 1) · (K + 1) · |V |, (|Π | · (K+ 1) + 1) · |V | · K} .
Let us first notice that if all the edges of G are labelled with the same cost (i.e., cmax = cmin
and K = 1), then
d′ = (|Π |+ 1) · 2 · (|V |+ (cmax − 1) · |E|), and
d = (|Π |+ 1) · 2 · |V | .
And so,
if cmax = cmin = 1, then d
′ = d = (|Π |+ 1) · 2 · |V |, and
if cmax = cmin > 1, then d
′ > d .
When K > 1, the comparison between d and d′ depends on the values of many parameters
of the game. For example, if the graph of the game has five vertices, three edges of cost 1
and one edge of cost 100, then it is more interesting to use the game G′ and techniques from
Section 3 to construct the Nash equilibrium, because in this case, d′ = (Π + 1) · 2 · 104 and
d = (|Π | · 101 + 1) · 5 · 101, and so d >> d′.
6 Conclusion and Perspectives
In this paper, we first prove the existence of finite-memory Nash equilibria for quantitative
multiplayer reachability games played on finite graphs. We also prove that this result remains
true when the model is enriched by allowing n-tuples of non-negative costs on edges (one cost
by player), answering a question we posed in [4]. Moreover we extend our existence result to
quantitative games where both safety and reachability objectives coexist. Secondly, we prove
the existence of finite-memory secure equilibria for quantitative two-player reachability games
played on finite graphs.
There are several interesting directions for further research. First, we intend to investigate
the existence of secure equilibria in the n-player framework. Notice that the proof techniques
related to our results on secure equilibria rely on the two-player assumption. Furthermore,
we also want to investigate deeper the size of the memory needed in the equilibria. This
could be a first step towards a study of the complexity of computing equilibria with certain
requirements, in the spirit of [9]. We also intend to look for existence results for subgame
perfect equilibria. Finally we would like to address these questions for other objectives such as
Bu¨chi or request-response.
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